"Why Japan Couldn't Avoid Pearl Harbor" The Inconvenient Truth There

"Why Japan Couldn't Avoid Pearl Harbor" The Inconvenient Truth.

The cause is in the "Hull Note".

To say that prewar Japan was "wrong" is to stop thinking.

On 8 December 1941 (Japan time), 350 Japanese Navy fighter planes launched a surprise attack on the United States Pacific Fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu, Hawaii—a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour.

Many Japanese are taught that Japan's political diplomacy before the Pacific War, or in the prewar years that followed the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, was morally "wrong". But to argue emotionally that something went wrong is to stop thinking. Instead, we must look objectively, neutrally and rationally at why and how the event happened.

I know this article is controversial, but I would like to clarify an "inconvenient truth" about the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The attack on Pearl Harbor was not caused by factors unique to Japan, such as the pathology of militarism or the immaturity of prewar society. Still, by the universal human nature of anger - at that time, it was caused by Hull Note. --It is said that it was caused by.

1)

As the realist John J. Mearsheimer put it, the problem with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor is this: "Why did Japan decide in 1941 to go to war with the United States, which had about eight times the potential? Did they do it?''

Or why Japan has been embroiled in the Sino-Japanese War since the 1930s, dependent on foreign countries for many natural resources, and importing about 80% of the fuel for its naval battleships from the United States. It can be said that Japan started a war against its trading partner, the United States.

2)

Below, we will solve this puzzle from the perspective of an angry retaliation model. Still, in conclusion, Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was by no means inevitable, and the United States must adopt a humiliating policy towards Japan by presenting the Hull Note. It may have changed the course of history.

3)

Although Konoe was replaced as prime minister by Tojo, it was not on the premise of a war-ready cabinet. Instead, Tojo, previously seen as a hardliner, accepted the Emperor's desire to avoid an outbreak of war and softened his stance to emphasise diplomatic negotiations.

On November 1, Prime Minister Tojo presented three options: (1) hold out without going to war, (2) decide to go to war immediately, and (3) conduct military preparations and diplomacy in parallel with the decision to go to war. Three were eventually chosen.

4)

At the Imperial Conference on November 5, the "Guidelines for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy'' were presented. In the end, Tojo said, ``By making diplomacy and operations a double pillar, we have shown America our determination. If this 'determination' is understood, he said, ``I think it is time to take diplomatic measures''.

As the influential historian Sumio Hatano wrote: "If the United States wants peace in the Pacific, and if Japan shows its `determination' there, the United States may reconsider. I had no choice but to offer a glimmer of hope.

5)

Hal Note was the one who made the non-war faction switch to the war faction.

According to the angry retaliation model, Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8 1941, was not necessarily a foregone conclusion. This is because if the United States presents a Hull Note that the Japanese leaders subjectively perceive as unfair, and if resentment is aroused. Mental coordination is not achieved, and the collective decision to attack Pearl Harbor will be difficult.

6)

Of course, this does not mean that the entire elite within the Japanese government was against the war. To be more precise, there was a conflict between the anti-war faction and the pro-war faction, which gave the pro-war faction the decisive advantage - and forced the anti-war coalition to switch to the pro-war side. , Hull note. And as will be shown below, this is also supported by the "data" that can be handled by the social sciences in the form of primary historical sources.

7)

On November 26, the United States delivered the Hull Note to Japan, which included (1) unconditional acceptance of the Four Hull Principles, (2) Japan's complete withdrawal from China and French Indochina, (3) repudiation of the National Government, and (4) the establishment of the Tripartite Pact. It was a complex search for an empty culture. As a result, outraged Japanese politicians decided to go to war with the United States.

8)

After the war, the US Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Clark Grew, said of the outbreak of the Pacific War: "It has always been my conviction that the button was pushed when the Hull Note was brought to Japan. ''.

Regarding contributing to the consensus of national opinion, it was indeed "genius''.

In the final report, the British Ambassador to Japan, Robert Leslie Craigie, said: "The 'final reply' (Hull Note) from the US Government to Japan is based on clauses Japan is certain to reject. It has happened," he said.

9)

Craigie states that "Japan's decision to go to war was made around the 27th (the date the Hull Note was received)'' and that "if Japan's compromise of November 20 had been the basis for negotiations, that decision would not have been made. No, or at least it would have been postponed.'' (Hypothesis No. 1).

The Hull Note increased the aggressiveness of the Japanese leadership. It became a political tool for the hardliners who wanted the war to persuade the moderates to go to war with the United States.

10)

As historian Yuu Moriyama has aptly argued, "The military and other proponents of open war welcomed the Hull Note. The commander-in-chief was the most feared scenario.

11)

On this point, Hatano concludes that "Hal Note was truly a "genius'' in finally solidifying the decision to go to war and contributing to the consensus of national opinion'' (Hypothesis No. 2).

12)

That's why I decided to "jump off the Kiyomizu stage".

* Do boldly as if you were "jump off the Kiyomizu stage" is a common saying used when making bold decisions.

Resentment creates a consensus for aggressive policies among domestic actors and enables groups of nations to act aggressively against enemy nations. It converged the preferences of the faction and the dovish faction towards starting a war against the United States.

13)

Moriyama writes, "The Hull Note unites all Japanese policymakers, from war hawks like the Joint Chiefs of Staff to negotiators like Togo". Then even Togo, who had made up his mind, decided to stay in his post". In other words, "Hull Note" united the leaders' hearts and made them jump off the Kiyomizu stage for a terrible war.

14)

At the section chiefs' meeting on December 1, Sato, section chief of the Military Affairs Division, said, "We have long been concerned that the US policy of appeasement is softening some of our views on Japan and that we may not be able to keep pace at an important time. I thought it would be a big problem, but I should be thrilled that I could reach a consensus of national opinion by receiving such a strong response (Kinbara Nisshi)'. (Hypothesis No. 3).

15)

Inconvenience for leftists who want to condemn Japan's prewar behaviour as "evil

So far, we have considered the attack on Pearl Harbor from the perspective of the wrathful retaliation model of evolutionary politics. By the way, why is the above explanation an "inconvenient truth"? This hot button of political correctness is the implication of this paper.

16)

In conclusion, the arguments in this paper are "inconvenient truths" because (1) the political left wants to condemn Japan's prewar actions as "evil", and (2) they advocate the strategic rationality of prewar Japan and the Pearl Harbor conspiracy theory. This is because there is a possibility that the political right, or (3) a historian delving into the historical event of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, will rub their nerves in the opposite direction.